. Thomson (Hare 1975 (Rawls 1971 (Friedman 1962, pp. 149-60 (Nozick 1974, pp. 30-35; 1981, pp. that is, pay no attention to the second until you have satisfied the first.
And obviously there are plenty of structural possibilities for weighing conflicting commitments.
Both these strategies assume that we retain a commitment to both intuitions that create the conflict. There are also strategies for revising or even scrapping one (or both!) intuitions that create the puzzle. I will mention two ways of drawing on our intuitions without taking them as ultimately decisive.
We might ask for a reason supporting some judgment. Asking tvhy over and over again can make us sound like philosophical skeptics, or stubborn five-year-olds---and the two have resemblances worth exploring. But (Shaw 1975, vol. 3, p. 226 (Foucault 1975; 1980, chapters 5-9 (Gutmann 1983, p. 66), we need to confront moral conflicts and to correct our images of how the world works. Finding a reasonable health policy, if there is one, will depend on getting our &dquo;values&dquo; and &dquo;facts&dquo; straighter than they now are.
